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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2016

Formal Analysis of Security Properties on the OPC-UA SCADA Protocol

Maxime Puys
Marie-Laure Potet
  • Fonction : Auteur

Résumé

Industrial systems are publicly the target of cyberattacks since Stuxnet [1]. Nowadays they are increasingly communicating over insecure media such as Internet. Due to their interaction with the real world, it is crucial to prove the security of their protocols. In this paper, we formally study the security of one of the most used industrial protocols: OPC-UA. Using ProVerif, a well known cryptographic protocol verification tool, we are able to check secrecy and authentication properties. We find several attacks on the protocols and provide countermeasures.
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Dates et versions

hal-01366059 , version 1 (14-09-2016)

Identifiants

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Maxime Puys, Marie-Laure Potet, Pascal Lafourcade. Formal Analysis of Security Properties on the OPC-UA SCADA Protocol. 35th International Conference, SAFECOMP 2016, Sep 2016, Trondheim, Norway. ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-45477-1_6⟩. ⟨hal-01366059⟩
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