J. Banks, Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control, Social Choice and Welfare, vol.28, issue.4, pp.295-306, 1985.
DOI : 10.1007/BF00649265

J. Bartholdi, C. A. Tovey, and M. A. Trick, Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election, Social Choice and Welfare, vol.35, issue.2, pp.157-165, 1989.
DOI : 10.1007/BF00303169

N. Betzler, R. Bredereck, and R. Niedermeier, Theoretical and empirical evaluation of data reduction for exact Kemeny Rank Aggregation, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, vol.34, issue.3, pp.721-748, 2014.
DOI : 10.1007/s10458-013-9236-y

D. Black, Theory of Committees and Elections, 1958.
DOI : 10.1007/978-94-009-4225-7

S. Bouveret, Whale 3

C. Brewer, Colorbrewer 2.0
DOI : 10.1559/152304003100011126

I. Caragiannis, C. Kaklamanis, N. Karanikolas, and A. D. Procaccia, Socially desirable approximations for Dodgson's voting rule, ACM Transactions on Algorithms, vol.10, issue.2, 2014.

A. Copeland, A reasonable social welfare function, Seminar on applications of mathematics to social sciences, 1951.

N. De-condorcet, Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité de décisions rendues à la pluralité de voix. Imprimerie Royal, facsimile published in 1972 by, p.1785

T. Dwyer, N. H. Riche, K. Marriott, and C. Mears, Edge Compression Techniques for Visualization of Dense Directed Graphs, IEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer Graphics, vol.19, issue.12, pp.2596-2605, 2013.
DOI : 10.1109/TVCG.2013.151

. Electowiki, Maximal elements algorithms, 2005.

P. Fishburn, Condorcet Social Choice Functions, SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, vol.33, issue.3, pp.469-489, 1977.
DOI : 10.1137/0133030

I. L. Grivko and V. Levchenkov, Intrinsic properties of the self-consistent choice rule. Automation and Remote Control, pp.689-697, 1994.

J. Laslier, Tournament Solutions and Majority Voting, 1997.
DOI : 10.1007/978-3-642-60805-6

V. Levchenkov, Social choice theory : a new sight, Preprint of the Institute for System Analysis, 1992.

N. Miller, A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting: Further Graph- Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting, American Journal of Political Science, vol.24, issue.1, pp.68-96, 1980.
DOI : 10.2307/2110925

C. North, P. Saraiya, and K. Duca, A comparison of benchmark task and insight evaluation methods for information visualization, Information Visualization, vol.9, issue.1, pp.162-181, 2011.
DOI : 10.1177/1473871611415989

P. Saraiya, C. North, and K. Duca, An Insight-Based Methodology for Evaluating Bioinformatics Visualizations, IEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer Graphics, vol.11, issue.4, pp.443-456, 2005.
DOI : 10.1109/TVCG.2005.53
URL : http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.204.8424

J. H. Smith, Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate, Econometrica, vol.41, issue.6, pp.1027-1041, 1973.
DOI : 10.2307/1914033

N. Tideman, Collective Decisions and Voting, Ashgate, 2006.

H. P. Young, Extending Condorcet's rule, Journal of Economic Theory, vol.16, issue.2, pp.335-353, 1977.
DOI : 10.1016/0022-0531(77)90012-6