Formal Analysis of Security Properties on the OPC-UA SCADA Protocol

Abstract : Industrial systems are publicly the target of cyberattacks since Stuxnet [1]. Nowadays they are increasingly communicating over insecure media such as Internet. Due to their interaction with the real world, it is crucial to prove the security of their protocols. In this paper, we formally study the security of one of the most used industrial protocols: OPC-UA. Using ProVerif, a well known cryptographic protocol verification tool, we are able to check secrecy and authentication properties. We find several attacks on the protocols and provide countermeasures.
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35th International Conference, SAFECOMP 2016, Sep 2016, Trondheim, Norway. 2016, 35th International Conference, SAFECOMP 2016. 〈https://www.ntnu.edu/safecomp2016〉. 〈10.1007/978-3-319-45477-1_6〉
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Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:16:31
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Maxime Puys, Marie-Laure Potet, Pascal Lafourcade. Formal Analysis of Security Properties on the OPC-UA SCADA Protocol. 35th International Conference, SAFECOMP 2016, Sep 2016, Trondheim, Norway. 2016, 35th International Conference, SAFECOMP 2016. 〈https://www.ntnu.edu/safecomp2016〉. 〈10.1007/978-3-319-45477-1_6〉. 〈hal-01366059〉

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